Household …nancial decisions are important for both households and the greater economy. Yet, our understanding of the process of …nancial decision-making is limited. Applying standard and two-sample instrumental variables strategies to census and credit bureau data, we provide the …rst precise, causal estimates of the e¤ects of education on …nancial behavior. Education has large e¤ects on …nancial market participation and smaller, but statistically and economically signi…cant e¤ects on …nancial management. We …nd that education improves credit scores, and dramatically reduces the probability of declaring bankruptcy or su¤ering foreclosure during the …nancial crisis. Examining mechanisms, we show that cognitive ability increases …nancial participation, and discuss how education may a¤ect decisionmaking through: attitudes, borrowing behavior, discount rates, risk-aversion, and the in ‡uence of coworkers and neighbors.
Introduction
Individuals face an increasingly complex menu of …nancial products. On the asset side of the balance sheet, the shift from de…ned bene…t to de…ned contribution pension plans, and the growing importance of private retirement accounts, require individuals to choose the amount they save, as well as the mix of assets in which they invest. Yet, participation in …nancial markets is far from universal in the United States, and we have only a limited understanding of what factors in ‡uence participation. On the liabilities side, a dramatic increase in the range and complexity of credit products to households has been accompanied by increased default, bankruptcy, and foreclosures. These trends have sparked a vigorous debate about whether individuals are well-equipped to make informed …nancial decisions.
Using data and estimation techniques new to the literature, this paper provides precise, causal estimates of the e¤ect of education on …nancial market participation and …nancial management. We exploit exogenous variation in education caused by changes in compulsory schooling laws. We …nd an additional year of education increases the probability of …nancial market participation by 7-8 percentage points, holding constant other factors, including income. The size of this e¤ect is economically important both on its own and in the context of previously identi…ed correlates of …nancial participation, such as trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008) , peer e¤ects (Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004) , prior life experience with the stock market (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) , or institutional quality (Osili and Paulson, 2008) .
To study the e¤ect of education on other aspects of …nancial behavior, we employ a twosample instrumental variables strategy using the same compulsory schooling laws, together with a new data set on consumer credit behavior. We …nd that exogenous increases in education lead to higher credit scores, more responsible …nancial behavior (fewer delinquent credit-card payments), and importantly, substantial reductions in the probability of bankruptcy and foreclosure. This e¤ect is particularly pronounced during the recent …nancial crisis.
We then explore why education in ‡uences …nancial behavior. Agarwal et al (2007) and Agarwal and Mazumder (2010) demonstrate the importance of cognitive ability for sound …-nancial decision making. By exploiting within-sibling group variation in cognitive ability, we show that indeed higher levels of cognitive ability lead to greater …nancial market participation. Importantly, these estimates are not confounded by unobserved background and family characteristics.
Finally, we describe ways in which education might a¤ect …nancial behavior. We …nd education e¤ects a measure of con…dence; borrowing decisions (such as whether to take a second mortgage); the probability one has a pension, through occupational choices; and the type of peers one has, through residential choices. Education does not a¤ect the probability of moving to another city, which may correlate with willingness to take risks.
Financial management is important for many reasons. For the household, it facilitates asset accumulation and consumption smoothing, with potentially signi…cant e¤ects on welfare. For the …nancial system as a whole, the depth and breadth of …nancial market participation are important determinants of the equity premium, the volatility of markets, and household expenditure (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Heaton and Lucas, 1999; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; and Brav, Constantinides, and Gezcy, 2002) . Financial behavior may also a¤ect the political economy of …nancial regulation, as those holding …nancial assets may have di¤erent attitudes towards corporate and investment income tax policy, as well as di¤erent attitudes towards risk-sharing and redistribution.
Several aspects of …nancial behavior, such as limited equity market participation, low savings rates, and, more recently, a high incidence of bankruptcy and foreclosures have drawn attention from economists as potentially inconsistent with standard models of optimizing behavior. While survey evidence has proven useful in demonstrating what factors are correlated with such behaviors 1 , there is much less understanding of what the causal drivers are. This paper contributes 1 Previous work has demonstrated that …nancial behavior is, not surprisingly, correlated with income, as well as education (Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2001 , among others), measured …nancial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007) , social connections (Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004) , trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008) , experience with the stock market (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) , and cognitive ability (Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa, 2011). to the literature by demonstrating an important causal determinant of …nancial behaviors that have been poorly understood.
In 2004 only 48.6% of households held stocks, either directly or indirectly (Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore, 2006) . Some view this limited participation in the stock market as a puzzle:
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) consider and reject risk aversion, belief heterogeneity, and other potential explanations, instead favoring "departures from expected-utility maximization." Our paper shows that low levels of education may help explain the limited participation puzzle.
At the lower end of the income spectrum, economists have focused on individuals'low savings rates and propensity to declare bankruptcy, and take on mortgages they cannot repay. Gross and Souleles (2002) note individuals borrow from credit cards when holding large bank account balances. Stango and Zinman (2009) show households systematically underestimate the returns to saving. Lusardi et al. (2011) …nd that a quarter of Americans would be unable to come up with $2,000 if needed within 30 days. Our second set of results sheds light on this …nancial management puzzle. We show exogenous increases in education improve individuals' credit scores. More educated individuals pay o¤ a greater share of their outstanding credit balance, are less likely to be delinquent on their credit card bills, and are less likely to declare bankruptcy or experience a foreclosure.
Data
This paper uses three complementary data sets: the U.S. Census, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax dataset, and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Summary statistics for the …rst two are presented in Table I , while summary statistics for the NLSY are presented in Online Appendix Table A1 .
We use a 5 percent sample from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Census Data 2 , representing a random draw of the US population. The key advantage of this data set is its size: with 2 The 2010 census did not include a "long form," and hence does not have information on investment income. over 14 million observations, we can use non-parametric controls, obtain precise estimates, and most importantly, use an instrumental variable strategies that would simply not be possible in most other, smaller, data sets.
The Census does not collect any information on …nancial wealth, and is very rarely used to study …nancial decision-making (an exception is Carroll, Rhee and Rhee, 1999) . However, it does collect detailed income data. Thus, the main measure of …nancial market participation we will use is "income from interest, dividends, net rental income, royalty income, or income from estates and trusts,"received during the previous year, which we term "investment income."Households are instructed to "report even small amounts credited to an account." (Ruggles et al., 2004) . A second type of income we use is "retirement, survivor, or disability pensions," received during the previous year, which we term "retirement income."This is distinct from Social Security and Supplemental Security Income, both of which are reported on separate lines. 3 A limitation of using the amount of investment income, rather than the amount invested, is that it is only partially informative about the amount and type of investments held by the respondent. This would make it di¢ cult to use the data for structural estimates of investment levels (such as calibrating models of participation costs). In this work, however, we focus primarily on the decision to participate in …nancial markets, for which we de…ne a dummy variable equal to one if the household reports any non-zero investment income. Approximately 22% of respondents do so, which is close to the 21.3% of families that report holding equity in the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore, 2006) , but lower than the 33% of households reporting any investment income in the 2001 SCF.
In online appendix tables A2 and A3, we compare our census data to data from the SCF.
We …nd the census data yield very similar estimates of means, medians and percentiles for our measures of participation and investment and retirement income. Regressions of investment 3 One may be concerned that small amounts of investment income simply represent interest from savings accounts. As a robustness check, we rerun our analysis considering only those who receive income greater than $500 (or, alternatively, $1000) in investment income as "participating." The results are very similar (available on request). income and …nancial market participation on individual characteristics in the two data sets yield strikingly similar coe¢ cients. Finally, we explore the relationship between reported investment income and more traditional measures of …nancial market participation. In particular, we …nd a large jump in the use of transactions accounts as individuals move from 0 to any positive amount of investment income. For example, 78.4% of households reporting no investment income possess a checking account, while 91.9% of those reporting income between 1 and 100 dollars have checking accounts. There is a similar, strongly positive and nearly linear relationship between reported investment income and participation in equity markets.
The FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax dataset is a quarterly longitudinal panel of individual credit bureau data, similar to information that would be contained in an individual's credit report. It is described in detail in Lee and van der Klaauw (2010) . The panel begins in the …rst quarter of 1999 and continues to the third quarter of 2011. The primary sample is made up of a random 5% sample of all U.S. residents aged 18 and up who have a credit report. The sample selection procedures ensure that, in any given quarter, there is a nationally representative cross-section, conditional on having a credit report. We restrict attention to individuals who are aged 36 to 75 in the third quarter of 2000, matching our census sample. Ultimately, we have approximately 5 million observations per quarter.
We focus on …ve key outcome variables from this data set: credit score, the proportion of an individual's credit card debt that is not delinquent, the proportion of quarters in which an individual has any delinquent credit card balance, a bankruptcy indicator, and a foreclosure indicator. The credit score, similar to a FICO score, predicts the likelihood of being 90 or more days delinquent over the next 24 months. Credit scores range from 280 to 850, and higher scores imply a lower probability of being seriously delinquent in the future. Both credit score and the proportion of an individual's credit card debt that is not delinquent are averaged across all quarters. The bankruptcy and foreclosure variables indicate whether an individual has undergone bankruptcy or foreclosure at least once, respectively, between 1992 and 2011. These indicators are able to track bankruptcies and foreclosures back through 1992 because credit bureaus maintain records on bankruptcy and foreclosure proceedings for 7 years.
The NLSY79 is a survey of 12,686 Americans aged 14 to 22 in 1979, with annual follow-ups until 1994, and biennial follow-ups afterwards. Each survey contained detailed questions on the individual's savings decisions and accumulated assets. Importantly, in 1980 survey respondents completed the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), a set of 10 exams that measure cognitive ability and knowledge. More details on these data are included in an online appendix.
The E¤ect of Education on Financial Market Participation

Empirical Strategy
Results from previous literature and simple regressions on our data strongly suggest that households with higher levels of education are more likely to participate in …nancial markets. Campbell (2006) , for example, notes that educated households in Sweden diversify their portfolios more e¢ ciently. 4 However, the simple relationship between …nancial decisions and education levels omits many other important factors, such as ability or family background, that are also likely to in ‡uence …nancial decisions. In this section we exploit an instrumental variables strategy developed by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) -changes in state compulsory education laws -which provides exogenous variation in education. Revisions in state laws a¤ected individuals'education attainment, but are not correlated with individual ability, parental characteristics, or other potentially confounding factors.
In particular, we follow the strategy laid out by Lochner and Moretti (2004, hereafter LM) , who use changes in schooling requirements between 1914 and 1978 to measure the e¤ect of education on incarceration rates. The principal advantage of following LM closely is that they have conducted a battery of speci…cation checks, demonstrating the validity of using compulsory schooling laws as a natural experiment. For example, LM show that there is no clear trend in educational attainment in the years prior to changes in schooling laws and that compulsory schooling laws do not a¤ect college attendance.
The structural equation of interest is the following,
where s i is years of education for individual i, and X i is a set of controls, including age, gender, To preclude the possibility of revealing personal information, the Census "top-codes" values for very rich individuals. Speci…cally, they replace the income variable for individuals with investment income or retirement income above a year-speci…c limit with the median income of all individuals in that state earning above that limit. The percentage of topcoded observations is very low: 0.47% for investment income and 0.22% for retirement income. Of course, using as a dependent variable "any investment income"avoids the top-coding problem entirely. Nevertheless, as an alternative approach, we run Tobit regressions to account for top-coding, and …nd very similar results (available upon request).
Following Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and LM, we create dummy variables for whether the years of required schooling are 8 or less, 9, 10, and 11 or more. 7 These dummies are based on the law in place in an individual's state of birth when an individual turns 14 years of age.
As LM note, migration between birth and age 14 will add noise to this estimation, but the IV strategy is still valid. The …rst stage for the IV strategy can then be written as
where s i is years of schooling, Comp9 -Comp11 are dummy variables that indicate the required number of years of schooling that individual i was exposed to, and X i is the same set of controls de…ned above. 12, 1-3 years of college, and college degree or more. We translate these categories into years of schooling by assigning each range of grades the highest number of years of schooling for that category. This should not a¤ect our estimates since individuals who fall within the ranges of grades 1-8 and 1-3 years of college will not be in ‡uenced by the compulsory schooling laws.
Finally, it is worth noting that the estimates produced here are Local Average Treatment E¤ects, which measure the e¤ect of education on participation for those who were a¤ected by the compulsory education laws. 9 We note that those who are in fact a¤ected by the laws are likely to have low levels of participation, and thus constitute a relevant study population. Moreover, 7 Speci…cally, we de…ne the years of mandated schooling as the di¤erence between the latest age an individual is required to stay in school and earliest age she is required to enroll when states do not set the minimum required years of schooling. When these two measures disagree, we take the larger value. 8 LM use the 1960 8 LM use the , 1970 8 LM use the , and 1980 censuses, which contain information on correctional facility residence, and focus on a narrower age group, ages 20-60. 9 Imbens and Angrist (1994) provides a discussion of Local Average Treatment E¤ects.
we draw some comfort from Oreopoulos (2006) , who studies a compulsory schooling reform that a¤ected a very large fraction of the population in the United Kingdom. Studying the e¤ect of education on earnings, Oreopoulos …nds the LATE e¤ect estimated in the United States from a small fraction of the population is quite similar to the estimated e¤ect in the UK from a very large fraction of the population.
Education and Financial Market Participation
OLS estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table II . Panel A presents the results for the linear probability model, using "any income"as the dependent variable, and panel B studies the level of total income, and includes the controls described in the previous section. The OLS results have the expected signs: an additional year of education is associated with a 3.54 percentage point higher probability of …nancial market participation, $271 more in investment income, and $548 more in retirement income. We caution that these estimates are likely plagued by omitted variables bias -educational attainment is correlated with unobserved individual characteristics that may also a¤ect savings.
In Table III , we present the …rst stage, demonstrating that compulsory schooling laws did increase human capital accumulation. Clearly, the state laws do in ‡uence some individualswhen states mandate a greater number of years of schooling, some individuals are required to obtain more education than they otherwise would have acquired. A 9 th year or 10 th year of mandated schooling increases average years of completed education by 0.2 years, while requiring 11 years of education increases education by 0.26 years. Requiring students to remain in school for even one more year (9 years of required schooling) increases the probability of graduating high school by 3.9%. 10 Table IV presents 2SLS estimates of equation (1). Panel A reveals that an additional year of schooling increases the probability of having any investment income by 7.5 percentage points.
1 0 'Weak instruments'bias is not a problem in this context. We report the F-statistics of the excluded instruments in Table IV . The F-statistics range from 44.5 to 49.9, well above the critical values proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) .
For retirement investments, an additional year of schooling increases the probability of non-zero income by about 5.9 percentage points. These estimates are somewhat larger than the OLS estimates in Table II , suggesting a downward bias in the OLS.
In Panel B, we study the amount of income from these assets and …nd a large and signi…cant e¤ect on both types of investment income. The magnitudes are substantially larger than the OLS estimates: an additional year of schooling increases investment income and retirement income by $1760 and $966 respectively. 11 We …nd similar e¤ects if we use high school completion as the measure of schooling. Including a cubic in earned income (which includes wages and income from one's own business or farm) as a control does not a¤ect the results appreciably. The striking fact is that no matter what type of income control we include, we …nd a persistent and large impact of education on participation.
Our analysis of the Survey of Consumer Finances suggests a magnitude in terms of equity market participation. In the SCF data, an increase in investment income of $1,760 is associated with a 5 percentage point increase in the probability of owning stocks. 12 Another way to get at the economic importance of these estimates is to conduct the following back-of-the-envelope calibration exercise. This calibration also helps us to understand the source of the increase: does education raise investment earnings simply because households earn more money, while keeping the fraction of income saved constant, or does it a¤ect the savings rate as well?
The average individual in our sample is 49 years old. To simplify the algebra, we assume he earned a constant $20,000 (the average income for high school graduates in our sample) since he was 20 years old, 13 saved a constant 10% of his income at the end of each year and earned a 5% return on his assets. Assuming one additional year of schooling boosts wage income by 7% (an estimate from Acemoglu and Angrist 2000) , if the individual's savings rate did not vary with 1 1 Using IV Tobit for investment income yields very similar results; results are available on request. 1 2 The coe¤ecient of a regression of equity ownership on investment income (regression not reported) is .0000287 (t-stat 3.1), and $1,760*.0000287=.055. The point estimates on investment income, $1,759 per year, are much closer to this latter …gure, suggesting education increased the savings rate. Finally, it is also possible that education a¤ects the choice of asset allocation: better educated individuals may choose portfolios that yield higher returns, perhaps with lower fees and less tax impact.
Education and Financial Management
Analysis of the e¤ects of education on personal …nancial management is complicated by the fact that data on credit and education are derived from two distinct data sets; as the census data contain no personal identi…ers (and the FRBNY Consumer Credit/Equifax panel has only anonymous identi…ers), it is not possible to match individuals across the data sets. We therefore follow Angrist (1990) and adopt a two-sample instrumental variables approach. 16 We use the census data to estimate the relationship between compulsory schooling laws and education, and the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax to calculate the reduced form relationship between compulsory schooling laws and …nancial management. 17 The reduced form is estimated using one dataset, the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, = $27; 167: 1 6 Two-sample IV is relatively rare in …nance, but is used in Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2005) . 1 7 For a detailed discussion of the two-sample instrumental variables technique, please see section 4.4 of Angrist and Pischke (2008). which has data on individuals'state of residence and year of birth. 18 Table V provides reducedform estimates of the e¤ect of compulsory education on credit score and credit management, and the probability of …ling for bankruptcy or experiencing a foreclosure. The speci…cation parallels that of equation 1 except that the dependent variable is now a measure of credit management and the set of control variables does not include race, gender, census year or the cubic polynomial in earned income, since this information is not available in the credit bureau data. Column
(1) through (3) present strong evidence that compulsory schooling laws improve an individual's credit score. The reduced form e¤ect indicates that cohorts who are required to attend school through the 11 th grade have on average credit scores that are 1.7 points higher compared to cohorts not required to attend school beyond the 8 th grade. The compulsory attendance dummies are jointly signi…cant at the one-percent level in every speci…cation. Using years of schooling required rather than dummy variables yields an estimate that each year of required schooling increases credit scores by 0.253 points, signi…cant at the …ve percent level. Column (3) adds zipcode level …xed e¤ects, which control for geographic heterogeneity at a very …ne level (there are approximately 43,000 zip codes in the U.S.) The point estimate is smaller, but years of compulsory attendance is signi…cant at the 1 percent level.
Columns (4)- (9) examine the reduced form relationship between compulsory education laws and credit behavior, studying both the fraction of borrower balance that is non-delinquent (averaged over the period for which we have credit bureau data, 1999-2011), and the fraction of quarters a borrower has any delinquent credit. We …nd statistically signi…cant e¤ects on both. Finally, columns (10)-(15) study the e¤ect of compulsory schooling on the probability a household declares bankruptcy or experiences a foreclosure. Relative to those who were able to drop out before 9 th grade, cohorts in states that required attendance through the 11 th grade were one percentage point less likely to have declared bankruptcy, and one percentage point less likely to experience a foreclosure.
The reduced form results provide the average e¤ect on the exposed cohort. To understand the structural e¤ect of education on …nancial management, we turn to instrumental variables estimation, which provides the e¤ect of education on the individuals who are a¤ected by compulsory schooling. As stated above, because the credit score and bankruptcy data come from a di¤erent source than the education data, we cannot use a conventional instrumental variables strategy. Instead, we use a two-sample IV approach. 19 The …rst-stage regression speci…cation, equation 2, is the same as used in Table III , from the census data set, except that we only use data from the 2000 Census to estimate it in order to match the credit bureau data. The split sample IV estimates are constructed by combining moments from the …rst-stage with moments from the credit bureau dataset. We estimate standard errors in two ways. First, we provide robust standard errors, as described by Murphy and Topel (1985) . Second, we use a block bootstrap technique to account for possible correlation within birthyear-state groups.
Results are presented in Table VI . The point estimates using either estimation technique are quite similar, and suggest that education has important causal e¤ects on …nancial management.
The point estimate on the coe¢ cient for years of schooling, 7.7, is signi…cant at the one percent level using Murphy and Topel standard errors, suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in education (2.7 years) would raise an individual's credit score by 20 points. This result is signi…cant at the ten percent level using a block bootstrap estimation technique.
A 20 point movement in the credit score is less than one standard deviation in credit score, but there are certainly ranges where such perturbations can be very important. For example, Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) document how a 20 point di¤erence in credit score can impact both the cost and availability of certain home mortgage products. The e¤ect sizes for credit management are similar: a one-standard deviation increase in education increases the fraction of credit card balances kept current by 1.4 percentage points, relative to an unconditional average of 95.6%, and reduces the number of quarters delinquent by 3.5 percentage points, from a mean of 7.5 percentage points. 1 9 We thank the editor for this suggestion.
The point estimates of the e¤ect of education on bankruptcy and foreclosure are striking.
Over the sample period, 14.4% of individuals declare bankruptcy, and 5.8% experience at least one foreclosure. An additional year of education reduces the probability of …ling for bankruptcy by 3.3 percentage points, and foreclosure by 5.7 percentage points. These e¤ects are signi…cant at the 1 percent level (using Murphy and Topel standard errors), but the con…dence intervals do admit smaller e¤ect sizes, as small as 1.15 percentage points for bankruptcy and 2.18 percent for foreclosure. Table VI , we analyze whether education a¤ects bankruptcy and foreclosure similarly throughout our sample, or whether there is a di¤erential e¤ect during the recent …nan-cial crisis. We …nd that during non-crisis periods (1999Q2-2007Q3), education does not reduce bankruptcies or foreclosures. However, during the period since the …nancial crisis (2007Q3-2011Q4), we observe substantial e¤ects: an additional year of education reduces the probability of bankruptcy by 2.3 percentage points, and the probability of foreclosure by 4.6 percentage points.
In Panel B of
Because these outcomes are "worst-case" scenarios, they may be particularly relevant for the group of individuals a¤ected by our instrument. In this case, and in contrast to estimates that examine the e¤ect of education on income, the LATE estimates may not characterize the population parameter.
The economic implications of these results are important. Bankruptcy is costly to individuals, as it results in lower credit scores, and reduced access to credit, and to society, through the deadweight costs of debt collection (Cohen-Cole et al., 2009 ). Perhaps of even greater importance are the costs of foreclosure. Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) estimate that a foreclosure reduces the value of the foreclosed house by $44,000, but depresses the value of neighboring houses by a total of $148,000-$477,000.
Cognitive Ability and Savings
Having established the impact of education on …nancial behavior, we turn to examine some possible mechanisms. Recent evidence suggests that the primary value of education is to increase cognitive ability (Hanushek and Woessman, 2008) . Financial decisions are often complicated and cognitive ability may play an important role in helping households navigate these complications.
For example, household mortgage decisions are tremendously important, yet individuals regularly make costly mistakes when deciding whether to re…nance their mortgage (Schwartz, 2007) .
Even decisions such as which credit card to use, which bank to use, or in which mutual fund to invest, can involve complex trade-o¤s that require a nuanced understanding of probability and compound interest.
Some evidence in favor of the hypothesis that cognitive ability matters for …nancial decision making has already been documented. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) …nd that mutual fund managers who graduated from institutions with high average SAT scores outperform those who graduated from less selective institutions. Stango and Zinman (2009) show that households that exhibit the cognitive bias of systematically miscalculating interest rates from information on nominal repayment levels hold loans with higher interest rates, controlling for individual characteristics. In a study closely related to this section, Grinblatt et al. (2011a) …nd that Finnish individuals with higher IQs are more likely to participate in equity markets.
Only two other studies, to our knowledge, links actual measures of cognitive ability to investment decisions. Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2006) use a survey of households in Europe, which directly measured household cognitive ability using math, verbal, and recall tests. They …nd that cognitive abilities are strongly correlated with stock market participations. These results are correlations, and the degree to which causal interpretation may be assigned depends on the determinants of cognitive ability. Grinblatt et al (2011b) …nd that high-IQ traders select better stocks and exhibit fewer behavioral biases than low-IQ traders.
A limitation of this approach is that cognitive ability itself is correlated with other factors that also a¤ect …nancial decision making. Bias could occur if, for example, measured cognitive ability is correlated with wealth or the transfer of human capital from parent to child. This is likely the case. Plomin and Petrill (1997) , in a survey of the literature, …nd that both genetic variation and shared environment play a signi…cant role in explaining variation in measured cognitive ability. 20 The importance of family background suggests that the coe¢ cient from a regression of investment behavior on measured IQ which does not correctly control for parental circumstances may be biased upwards. 21
Empirical Strategy
One compelling strategy to remove the potential confound of family environment is to study siblings, who grew up with similar backgrounds. Labor economists have used this technique extensively to identify the e¤ect of education on earnings (see, e.g., Ashenfelter and Rouse 1998) . Including a sibling group …xed-e¤ect provides a substantial advantage, as it controls for a wide range of observed and unobserved characteristics. Most of the remaining variation in cognitive ability is thus attributable to the random allocation of genes to each particular child. 22 There are limitations to this approach as well. Children without siblings are of course excluded. The errors-in-variables bias is potentially exacerbated when di¤erencing between siblings (Griliches 1979) . Finally, as demonstrated in Bound and Solon (1999) , if the endogenous variation is not eliminated when comparing between siblings, the resulting bias may constitute an even larger proportion of the remaining variation than in traditional cross-sectional studies.
This concern may be less severe in the case of cognitive ability when measured at an early age, because individuals do not choose cognitive ability in the way they choose how many years of 2 0 For example, the correlation between parental IQ and children reared apart is approximately 0.24, providing evidence that genes in ‡uence IQ. Similarly, the correlation between two unrelated individuals (at least one adopted) raised in the same household is approximately 0.25.
2 1 Mayer (2002) surveys evidence on the relationship between parental income and childhood outcomes, and describes a strong consensus that higher parental income and education is associated with higher measured cognitive ability among children.
2 2 Plomin and Petrill (1997) note that the correlation in IQ of monozygotic (identical) twins raised together is much higher than dizygotic (fraternal) twins raised together.
schooling to obtain. While unobserved characteristics such as motivation and discount rates may a¤ect educational attainment, they are unlikely to a¤ect measures of childhood cognitive ability. Benjamin and Shapiro (2007) employ this method to study how cognitive ability is correlated with various behaviors, including …nancial market participation, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). They regress a dummy for stock market participation on a set of controls, a sibling group …xed-e¤ect, and a measure of cognitive ability. We expand this analysis in several directions. We look at a range of …nancial assets, considering both the extensive and intensive margins, and …nally unpack cognitive ability into two components, knowledge and ability. The former is meant to capture factual aspects of cognitive ability Using these test scores, we estimate the e¤ect of cognitive ability, knowledge and education on …nancial decision making (y it ) with the following equation
where ability i is a measure of innate ability, knowledge i is a measure of acquired knowledge, education it is the highest grade individual i has completed by year t; X it includes age, race, gender and survey year e¤ects, and SG i are sibling-group …xed e¤ects. Standard errors are corrected for intracluster correlation within an individual over time. We proxy for permanent income by controlling for the log of family income 23 in every available survey year from 1979 to 2002, and including dummy variables for missing data. 24
Results
Results are presented in We also drop all observations which are top-coded; the cut-o¤ varies by year and outcome variable, but typically does not exclude many individuals. We do not include individuals who are cousins, step-siblings, adopted siblings, or only related by marriage or households with only one respondent.
To ensure that our results are not driven by large cognitive di¤erences between siblings due to mental handicaps, we cut the data in two ways. Our results are robust to dropping all households where any individual is determined to be mentally handicapped at any time between 1988 and 1992 when the question was asked. In addition, our results are robust to dropping siblings with a cognitive ability di¤erence greater than 1 standard deviation of the sample by race. We …nd similar results when we focus on savings in 401Ks and pre-tax accounts. Ability and knowledge are jointly signi…cant at the ten percent level. Education has a signi…cant e¤ect on savings in IRAs and Keogh accounts (Column (4)). Ability increases participation in taxdeferred accounts such as 401Ks by 5 percentage points. One year of schooling increases both participation in IRAs and Keogh accounts by 1.1 percentage points and participation in taxdeferred accounts by 1.3 percentage points. The e¤ects are substantially smaller for certi…cates of deposit, loans and mortgage assets (Column (6)).
Our results might be confounded by strategic parents, who increase or decrease parental transfers to children as a function of their cognitive ability. Column (7), which examines respondents'anticipated transfers, shows that this does not happen.
Finally, in Column (8) we look at an outcome variable, classi…ed as "other income" from 1979 to 2002, which includes income from investment and other sources of income, 26 which corresponds closely to our measure of investment income from the Census. Ability, knowledge and education all have a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on income from these sources: one standard deviation in knowledge increases the probability of having any such income by 5.3 percentage points, one standard deviation in ability increases the probability by 4.1 percentage points, and one year of schooling by 1.5 percentage points.
These results suggest that education, ability and knowledge acquired in school increase participation in …nancial markets. 27 Acquired knowledge matters only for one investment class (stocks, bonds, and mutual funds), while cognitive ability is associated with all assets and methods of investing measured in the data. The F-test reported at the bottom of Panel A indicate that knowledge and ability are jointly signi…cant at either the …ve or ten percent level.
Our …nding that cognitive ability is more important than acquired knowledge is consistent with a growing recognition of the key role of cognitive ability in determining economic outcomes (Hanushek and Woessman, 2008) . Our analysis suggests one channel through which schooling may matter: it a¤ects cognitive ability, which in turn a¤ects savings and investment decisions.
The magnitudes of the e¤ects we identify are large, and may well account for a substantial fraction of unexplained variation in …nancial behavior. The list of assets changes slightly from year to year, but always includes interest on savings, net rental income, any regular or periodic sources of income. In 1987, the question also lists worker's compensation, veteran's bene…ts, estates or trusts and up until 1987, also includes payments from social security. From 1987 to 2002, the interviewer also listed interest on bonds, dividends, pensions or annuities, royalties.
Due to the wording of the question (asking for "any other source"of income), we treat this question as constant. The results are robust to focusing only on questions which ask about precisely the same set of assets.
2 7 Columns (1)- (3) of Appendix Table A4 demonstrate that the relationship between schooling and cognitive ability holds in sibling pairs.
Other Mechanisms
How else might education a¤ect …nancial management? One possibility that has received some attention is the fact that high school students in many states are required to attend …nancial education courses. Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (2001) study mandatory high school …nancial education requirements, …nding large e¤ects. However, Cole and Shastry (2011) revisit this question using the U.S. Census, and provide evidence that high school …nancial education did not in fact have any e¤ect on individuals'…nancial behavior.
We begin our search for mechanisms by exploring whether the impact of education works through changing the set of people an individual interacts with, either at home or work. Finally, we examine whether education may a¤ect preferences and beliefs, such as attitudes towards risk and feelings of control.
Education changes the set of job opportunities available to individuals. For example, a highschool degree may lead an employee to a salaried job at a large corporation, which facilitates …nancial market participation. We test for this in the following manner. Using data from the 1970 census, we identify the share of individuals aged 65-70 in each occupation in each state receiving a pension. We use the 1970 census because it includes the individuals' occupation from 5 years prior to the survey. 28 We use this fraction as a measure of the pension probability for each individual in our dataset from 1980, 1990, and 2000 , and regress this probability on education, using the state laws as instruments, as in equation (1). The result is presented in Table VIII , Column (1). We …nd a positive relationship between education and the probability of …nding a job in which a pension is o¤ered, statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level. One year of schooling increases the probability of receiving a pension by 1%. All of the estimates in Table VIII mimic the education speci…cation, with controls for age, cohort, birth state, state of 2 8 The 1970 census does not include the retirement income variable we have been using this far. Instead, it groups pension income into "income from other sources," such as unemployment compensation, child support and alimony. We therefore de…ne an individual over 65 as having a pension if they received more than $1000 (in 1970 dollars) in other income during the previous year. The results are robust to using $2,500, $5,000 or $10,000 instead.
residence, gender, race, and income. Hong et al. (2004) …nd that peer e¤ects are important determinants of …nancial market participation. To test this channel, we use a similar approach: we calculate the percent of individuals aged 65 and older in every "neighborhood" in the U.S. who received retirement income, and use this as the dependent variable in equation (1). Neighborhoods are de…ned as county groups, single counties or census-de…ned "places" with a population of approximately 100,000. Results are presented in Column (2) of Table VIII . We …nd a remarkably similar e¤ect to that in Column (1): one year of schooling increases the share of retired neighbors with retirement income other than Social Security income by 1 percentage point. 29 A commonly advanced view is that education tempers impatience. Indeed, in a …eld study, Harrison et al. (2002) …nd that discount rates are strongly negatively correlated with levels of education. Of course, this correlation is hard to interpret: does education reduce discount rates, or do more impatient individuals select to enter the labor market earlier? While we cannot measure discount rates, we do observe whether households take …rst or second mortgages. We …nd that education does not have an e¤ect on whether a household takes out a …rst mortgage (Column (3)), but does signi…cantly reduce the likelihood a household takes out a second mortgage (Column (4)).
As a …nal direct mechanism, we explore whether education a¤ects individuals'willingness to take risks. Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) …nd a strong negative correlation between risk aversion and education. We do not have a good measure of attitudes towards risk from the census. However, one important risk an individual can take is to move in search of better opportunities.
Heitmueller (2005), for example, argues that risk aversion is an important determination of within-EU migration. We …nd no evidence that more educated individuals are more likely to move away from their city (Column (5)) or state (not reported) in the past …ve years. 30 We 2 9 The F-statistic of the excluded instruments in this column is much lower than that in previous results because we lose data from 1980 when more people were a¤ected by the laws. The 1980 census does not include the public use microdata area identi…ers. This suggests this result may su¤er from weak instruments bias.
3 0 Information on whether an individual moved to a di¤erent city is available only in the 1980 census. …nd evidence that more educated individuals are less likely to have moved into a di¤erent house within the city in the previous …ve years.
It is also possible that education a¤ects …nancial behavior through beliefs and attitudes.
Graham et al. (2005) …nd that educated investors report higher levels of con…dence and invest more abroad. Puri and Robinson (2007) show that optimistic individuals invest a greater share of their portfolio in equities, as compared to other …nancial instruments. We do not have a view on how education a¤ects optimism; it may well foster discipline and views on achieving speci…c goals, by changing individuals'beliefs and self-control. While few datasets consider personality and investment decisions in detail, the NLSY does ask respondents to indicate their agreement with the statement "I have little control over the things that happen to me," with 1 indicating strong disagreement and 4 indicating strong agreement. Individuals who feel more in control (or have greater self-control) may well be more likely to participate in …nancial markets.
Online Appendix Table A4 , using the same within-family identi…cation strategy, provides evidence from the NLSY that feelings of lack of control are greater among less educated individuals, and weakly greater among individuals with lower levels of cognitive ability.
To examine the relationship between control and …nancial decisions, we focus on investment decisions made after 1993, the year the personality measure was taken, using the same identi…ca-tion strategy as for cognitive ability. Results are presented in Table IX 
Conclusion
Household …nancial management is an important determinant of …nancial welfare (Campbell, 2006) . Participation in …nancial markets is limited. While over 90% of households have transactions accounts, the fraction of families that own bonds (17.6%), stock (20.7%), and other assets is relatively small. Low levels and low returns on savings may well be an important contributing cause to consumer bankruptcy.
This paper contributes to a growing body of literature exploring the importance of nonneo-classical factors to household investment decisions. We explore how education a¤ects …-nancial management, with a focus on discovering causal mechanisms. We …rst show education signi…cantly increases investment income. Individuals with one more year of schooling are 7.5
percentage points more likely to report positive investment income. Similarly, those with more years of schooling are signi…cantly more likely to report income from retirement savings.
Second, we study how education a¤ects consumers'borrowing and credit behavior. We …nd that cohorts induced to receive higher levels of education have higher credit scores on average and are signi…cantly less likely to be delinquent, declare bankruptcy or experience a foreclosure. Some of these e¤ects are less dramatic than the e¤ect of education on …nancial market participation:
an additional year of schooling raises an individual's credit score by 8 points (roughly 9% of a standard deviation). Others are even more dramatic: one year of schooling reduces the probability of bankruptcy by 3.3 percentage points, from a base of 14.4%.
Examining mechanisms, we …nd that cognitive ability itself is an important determinant of …nancial behavior. Controlling for family background, those with higher test scores are more likely to hold a wide variety of …nancial instruments, including stocks, bonds, mutual funds, savings accounts, tax-deferred accounts, and CDs. When cognitive ability is decomposed into innate abilities and acquired abilities or knowledge, the innate abilities matter for a greater number of …nancial instruments, but both types of ability a¤ect key measures of …nancial market participation such as having any accumulated assets and owning any stocks, bonds or mutual funds.
The point estimates on education suggest that it is a very important determinant of behavior.
A convenient metric to compare the relative importance across di¤erent studies is the "e¤ect size", which is the e¤ect of a one standard deviation change in the dependent variable on participation. The "e¤ect size" of education is 19.8 percentage points, which compares to an e¤ect size of trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales) of 4 percentage points, peer e¤ects (Hong and Stein) of 1.15 percentage points, and experience with stock market returns (Malmendier and Nagel) of 4.2 percentage points.
Three studies serve as potential benchmarks for these e¤ects. Du ‡o and Saez (2003) Concern about …nancial decision-making is not often cited as an important determinant of educational policy. Yet, it is worth pointing out that because education a¤ects …nancial market participation, studies that focus on wage earnings may in fact underestimate the returns to investment in human capital. Such estimates miss the reduction in the probability of bankruptcy and foreclosure. This suggests adjusting earlier cost-bene…t analyses of educational programs.
Moreover, a growing body of evidence suggests that individuals do often make …nancial mistakes (Agarwal et al., 2007) . Both micro evidence (Agarwal and Mazumder, 2010) Table II (2)
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Schooling on Income from Various Sources
( (1) and an indicator for whether the individual graduated high school in column (2). The independent variables of interest indicate whether the state in which the individual was born prohibited drop-out until a child had completed 9th grade, 10th grade, or 11th grade and higher. Other controls include fixed effects for gender, race, 3-year age groups, 10-year birth cohorts, state of birth, state of residence, census year and a cublic polynomial in earned income. Regressions also include state of residence fixed effect interacted with a dummy variable for being born in the South and turning age 14 in 1958 or later, to account for the impact of Brown v. Board of Education for blacks. Standard errors, corrected for arbitrary correlation within state of birth-year of birth, are in parentheses. (Numbers with *** indicate significance at the 1-percent level.)
Estimates of the Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on Education
High school 
(1)
Dependent Variable: This table shows cross-sectional second stage two sample IV regressions of credit outcomes on education. The sample comprises a 5% panel of American borrowers, restricted to borrowers who have data in every quarter of the panel from 1999 to 2011. Credit Score is averaged for each individual accross all quarters of data, and it can range from 280 to 850. The % of Balance Current represents the non-delinquent balance on credit cards divided by the total credit card balance, averaged over the entire panel. The % of Quarters Delinquent represents the proportion of quarters an individual has any delinquent balance on his/her credit card bills. Bankruptcy and Foreclosure are indicators for having undergone bankruptcy or foreclosure at least once, respectively, between 1992 and 2011. We include 35-75 year olds. The independent variable, years of schooling, is instrumented using compulsory schooling laws. Control variables included (coefficients not reported) in these regressions were dummies for 3-year age cohorts, 10-year birth cohorts, state-of-residence, and a dummy for being born in a southern state and turning age 14 1994 -2000 1994 -2000 1994 -2000 (5) (6) 1990 -2004 1988 -2000 (7) 1988 -2000 Census data have not been used much to track investment income, and one may naturally have concerns about the reliability of the data, as well as comparability with more standard data sources, such as the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). In this appendix, we compare the means and distributions of the variables of interest, and describe the relationship between investment income and …nancial wealth. In the census data, we use the variable "INCINVST" as a measure of investment income, and the variable "INCRETIR" for retirement income (see Ruggles et. al, 2004) . For the SCF, we use the sum of non-taxable investment income (x5706), other interest income (x5708), dividends (x5710), and income from net rent, trusts, or royalties (x5714). In both the census and the SCF, reported numbers appear to be pre-tax income, though the census …gures are less precise. Neither the SCF nor census measure includes capital gains. (The income portion of the questionnaire for the census is reproduced below). Retirement income is measured in the SCF as the sum of current account-type pension bene…ts and nonaccount-type bene…ts. 31 Table A2 presents the means, standard deviations, ranges, and percentiles for the investment income and retirement income variables. Analysis is limited to a sample of households aged 36-75, who earn investment income below $50,000. (This is the same sample used to evaluate the e¤ect of education on investment income.) Relative to the SCF, census respondents appear to underreport both investment and retirement income. The mean investment income is 17 percent lower, at $1,264, compared to the SCF average …gure of $1,515. A nearly identical percent fewer report receiving any invesment income: the …gure is 33% in the SCF, and 27% in the Census. We speculate that the reason for this is that the survey of consumer …nances is much more detailed than the census, and that the SCF is done in person. Nonetheless, the distributions appear to be comparable, with a median of zero in both datasets, and similar 75 th, , 90 th , and 99 th percentiles.
The apparent underreporting of retirement income in the U.S. Census is more severe: the average reported in the census is approximately 30 percent lower than the average in the SCF, and approximately 20 percent fewer individuals report any retirement income in the U.S. Census: 22 percent, against 27 percent in the SCF. Nonetheless, again the two distributions appear to track one another reasonably closely.
The results suggest that the dollar …gures estimated from the census may not be precisely correct. Nevertheless, the two data sources are not strikingly di¤erent, and the e¤ect on estimated coe¢ cients is likely relatively small.
An alternative check of the comparability of the two datasets is to regress the dependent variables used in our main paper on individual characteristics, such as age, income, race,and education level. The coe¢ cients obtained from the SCF and Census are quite similar. Indeed, equality cannot be rejected for 35 out of 36 demographic variables. (Results not reported.)
Appendix Table A3 provides a detailed breakdown of …nancial market participation, using the 2001 SCF. Each row reports the fraction of households that use a variety of …nancial services, for a given range of investment income. The ranges were chosen so that there would be at least 30 observations in each range. For example, 61% of households report earning no investment income. Among this population, 88% have a transaction account (checkings, savings, or moneymarket fund). As reported investment income increases, …nancial market participation generally increases.
A second potential concern with the use of census data is that information is available on investment income, not …nancial wealth. In particular, if the relationship between …nancial wealth and investment income is highly non-linear, results using one measure may not translate well to the other. Figure A1 plots the relationship between investment income and …nancial wealth, from a Fan local linear regression, using data from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. While visual inspection reveals a slight increase in slope around the point of $25,000 (consistent with evidence from Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2007 , that investors with higher income achieve higher risk-adjusted returns), to a …rst approximation, the relationship is linear.
Census Income Questions
We reproduce here the questions on income from the 2000 Census "long form." For income received jointly, report, if possible, the appropriate share for each person; otherwise, report the whole amount for only one person and mark the "No" box for the other person. If exact amount is not known, please give best estimate. a. Wages, salary, commissions, bonuses, or tips from all jobs -Report amount before deductions for taxes, bonds, dues, or other items.
O 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
The NLSY79 cohort is a nationally representative sample of young people aged 14-22 when the survey began in 1979. Respondents were interviewed annually until 1994 and then biennially since 1996. While each survey contains di¤erent questions and often special sets of questions on topics such as military participation, time-use or alcohol and substance abuse, each survey contains a core set of questions on respondents'labor force experience, labor market attachment, investments in education and training. Summary statistics on the variables used in this paper are available in Appendix Table A1 . From these questions, sta¤ at the Center for Human Resource Research create consistently coded variables on a number of demographic characteristics. Two such variables are used in the estimates above. Information on educational attainment and enrollment has been used to create a variable for highest grade completed as of May 1 of the survey year. Separate questions on income from various sources have been used to create a consistent estimate of "total net family income". This variable summarizes all income received in the household, and does not account for taxes or other adjustments. From 1979 to 1986 total net family income was calculated from a Household Interview administered to parents for respondents who lived with their parents. While 19 sources of income are asked separately (such as wages, military income, farm income, business income, inheritance and gifts), income from investments is included in the "Other Income" category: "Aside from the things you have already told me about, during 19XX, did you (or your spouse/partner) receive any money from any other sources such as the ones on this card? For example, things like interest on savings, payments from social security, net rental income, or any other regular or periodic sources of income?" Questions on di¤erent types of assets, such as IRAs and Keogh accounts or 401Ks and pre-tax annuities, di¤er slightly across years, resulting in question-speci…c sample periods.
In 1980, respondents in the NLSY79 sample were adminstered the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) in a joint e¤ort of the U.S. Departments of Defense and Military Services to update the ASVAB norms. In total, 11,914 NLSY79 respondents (94% of the sample) participated in the test. The ASVAB measures di¤erent aspects of ability, knowledge and skill in 10 tests, each in one of the following areas: general science, arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, numerical operations, coding speed, auto and shop information, mathematics knowledge, mechanical comprehension and electronics information. Scores on these tests are used to estimate each respondent's percentile score in the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), as well as our measures of knowledge and ability. The AFQT score is a function of the individual's score on tests in arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension and numerical operations. Our measure of innate ability uses these tests plus a test in coding speed, while our measure of acquired knowledge includes tests in general science, auto and shop information, mathematics knowledge, mechanical comprehension and electronics information. Our results are robust to slightly di¤erent decompositions.
